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STATE OF UTAH 
A.C.KARTCHNER~diREXE 
B. KARTCHXER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LYMAN :MERRILL HORNE, 
FREDERICK C. SORENSEN, 
and CLICQUOT CLUB BOT-
TLING C01IPANY OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH, a corpora-
tion, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7911 
This is an action against the receiver of Clicquot 
Club Bottling Company, Lyman Merrill Horne and 
Frederick C. Sorensen to rescind a transaction whereby 
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the personal defendants, as officers of this corporation, 
issued stock of the corporation to plaintiffs. 
The defendant corporation was formed in 1947 for 
the purpose of bottling and merchandising soft drinks. 
When the corporation was formed, 200,000 shares of 
common stock were authorized, issued and paid for by 
the stockholder8. Ownership of this stock was as follows: 
Frederick Sorensen -------------------------------------- 101,000 
Winders ---------------------------------------------------------- 48,000 
Hornes ------------------------------------------------------------ 41,000 
Stanis ----------------------------------------------·--------··------- 10,000 
TOTAL________________________ 200,000 
All the stockholders, except Stanis, were members 
of Dr. Horne's family. 
The business progressed in a profitable manner, 
more or less, until the latter part of 1948 and fore part 
of 1949. In the summer of 1949, Dr. and Mrs. Horne 
had advanced $19,000.00 to the company and advised 
their son-in-law, Frederick Sorensen, who was manag-
ing the enterprise, that they were not in a position to 
advance any further sums. Sorensen was told by them 
to obtain someone else to contribute capital and they 
would forgive their debt against the corporation and 
turn their stock in. 
Thereafter, Sorensen undertook to find someone to 
come into the business with him and after negotiations 
over two or three months, plaintiffs agreed to purchase 
100,000 shares of this corporate stock from the corpora-
tion for the sum of $12,000.00 and two trucks valued at 
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$6,000.000, or a total purchase price of $18,000.00. This 
arrangement was concluded in 'Septeinber, 1949, when 
the first payment was n1ade to the corporation. Plaintiff 
A. C. Kartchner was to become actively engaged in tlw 
business on November 1st. Payn1ents by plaintiffs for 
the stock continued, in irregular amounts from Septem-
ber 23, 1949 to :llarch 6, 1950. Pa-yments were made over 
this period from a joint checking account of both plain-
tiffs. 
On October 31st, Dr. Horne was advised by Sorensen 
that he had concluded a deal whereupon Dr. Horne en-
dorsed his stock, wrote a letter resigning as an officer 
and put his stock together with Sorensen's stock, which 
he had been holding, in an envelope addressed to the 
bottling company and mailed the same. These certificates 
representing 142,000 shares were at the Clicquot Club 
Bottling Company on November 1, 1949, (R. 218, 219, 
182, 183). These certificates of stock remained as part 
of the books and records of the Clicquot Club Bottling 
Company thereafter. Sorensen's stock bears his endorse-
ment. 
Sometime during the day on November 1, 1949, a 
certificate No. 15, for 100,000 shares, was issued to plain-
tiffs. This certificate bears the signature of Dr. Horne 
and Mr. Sorensen. There is positive testimony that these 
certificates were in the office of the corporation on No-
vember 1st (R. 218). Mr. Sorensen was unable to say 
whether the certificates mailed by Dr. Horne arrived at 
the office before or after plaintiffs' certificate was de-
livered to plaintiffs (R. 228, 229). 
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Upon the issuance of this certificate to plaintiffs, 
oaths of office were executed by Mr. Sorensen and both 
plaintiffs, and the affairs of the corporation were there-
after conducted by Sorensen and A. C. Kartchner. Plain-
tiff A. C. Kartchner became Secretary and Treasurer 
and the custodian of the books and records of this cor-
poration on such date. Mrs. Kartchner became a direc-
tor. 
Mr. Kartchner was advised of the stockholdings 
prior to November 1st, and fully informed (R. 224, 215, 
216, 217). Originally it was expected that all the other 
stock would be returned and that Kartchners and Sor-
ensen would each have 100,000 shares, but it was under-
stood between Kartchner and Sorensen that Sorensen 
would take a reduction from that number of shares in 
the amount of the stock then outstanding that was not 
returned. This arrangement was known and confirmed 
prior to November 1, 1949 and later in a meeting these 
two men had with Homer "\Vinder in the middle o~ 
December, 1949. 
In the fore part of June, 1950, the company was 
again in financial difficulties and Mary Winder, one of 
the stockholders, was endeavoring to purchase the half 
interest of plaintiffs' in the company. For this purpose 
she sought the advice of her brother-in-law, Judge 
Joseph G. Jeppson, and a meeting was held where the 
stockhoidings were discussed and where plaintiff A. C. 
Kartchner admitted that he was aware of the fact that 
'Sorensen's interest was reduced to 42,000 shares, which 
had not 'been issued to him by the corporation (R. 245, 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 7). This certificate due Sorensen was not issued 
because he hoped to have other stock surrendered there-
by increasing the amount due him. At the time of this 
meeting, Sorensen had withdrawn from the corporation 
and was employed in Idaho. 
Later in July, the company was put into receivership 
and this is the first notice anyone had that l\Ir. l{artchner 
claimed his stock was void, whereupon this action was 
commenced. 
The trial Court found that full disclosures were 
made throughout of the facts surrounding the initial 
agreement between Kartchner and Sorensen and the 
record shows that these were amply supported. 
This action was commenced by a complaint (R. 1) 
which alleged that defendants Horne and Sorensen issued 
100,000 shares of common stock of the Clicquot Bottling 
Works to plaintiffs, as the officers of this corporation. 
This complaint alleges that their action in so doing was 
a deliberate fraud inasmuch as they knew such stock 
certificate represented an over-issue. This pleading 
sought recovery of $18,272.44, which represented cash, 
as alleged, paid for this stock. 
Later this complaint was amended (R. 11) to allege 
that $12,272.44 was paid in cash and $6,000.00 was repre- · 
sen ted by two (2) trucks. To this complaint, defendants. 
Horne and Sorensen filed a motion for summary judg-
ment (R. 13), supported by affidavits and the deposition 
of plaintiff. These supporting documents present the 
same evidence as was presented at the trial. . 
Later, a second amended complaint (R. 50) was filed,· 
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which, in addition to the matter of over-issue, injected 
a theory of fraud based on the fact that the accounts 
payable were misrepresented and that the transaction 
was rendered voidable because of such misrepresenta-
tions by defendant Sorensen. On the trial of the matter 
considerable of the evidence was addressed to this new 
question raised by the second complaint, which involved 
the amount of debts owed by the corporation. 
At the time of trial another amendment (R. 100) 
was made where the amount of recovery asked was 
reduced to $18,046.53. After the trial another amended 
complaint (R. 72) was filed, in which fraud of any kind 
was eliminated. This amendment was ostensibly and 
expressly made to conform to the evidence and this 
amendment alleges that the mere fact of the issue of 
stock being made is sufficient without the other elements 
of fraud. 
The Court found that the defendants were in exer-
cise of good faith throughout the whole transaction, 
which is amply supported by the record. 
The overwhelming weight of the evidence in this 
case supports the proposition that the certificate of stock 
of Fred Sorensen was surrendered on November 1st 
when the certificate of stock for 100,000 shares was issued 
to plaintiffs. This is conclusively demonstrated by this 
fact alone: It was admitted on all sides that there were 
200,000 shares, only, authorized. This, of necessity, re-
quired the cancellation of Sorensen's 101,000, irrespective 
of the other holdings and the disposition of such other 
holdings, and plaintiff Kartchner knew this long before 
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November 1st when his stock was issued (R. 215, 216, 
217). In other words, if the Stanis, Winder and IIorne 
stock had been surrendered as originally contemplated 
it 1ca.s still n.ecessary that Sorensen's certificate be can-
celled. Plaintiff Kartchner would have to know this even 
under his version of the story, which was given no 
credence, and properly so, by the trial Court. 
Appellants, throughout their brief, assttme that the 
Sorensen certificate was not endorsed on N oven1ber 1, 
1949. The fact is undisputed that Sorensen's stock 
endorsed was a part of the books and records of this 
corporation on November 1st. The record is quoted front 
Page 180 to support the proposition that the stock was 
not endorsed on November 1st. The only date mentioned 
in the record, Page 180, is the date of October 31st, at 
which time it was admittedly not endorsed. Mr. Sorensen 
(R. 182), in referring to that part of his deposition re-
ferred to in the record at page 180, explicitly testifies 
to the fact that the date referred to in the record at 180, 
and as quoted on Page 18 and 19 of appellants' brief, re-
ferred to October 31st and not November 1st. 
There is no positive evidence in this record when 
Sorensen's endorsement was attached. The logical as-
sumption is that it was signed on. November 1st in view 
of the avowed intention of everyone connected with this 
case, including plaintiffs. 
Dr. Horne says he mailed the Sorensen certificate on. 
October 31st, and Sorensen says the certificate was in 
the office of the bottling company on November 1st. 
Sorensen's testimony (R. 218) : 
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"Q. Were Dr. Horne's shares of stock and your 
shares of stock in the office of the company 
that day (Nov. 1) ~ 
''A. rl,hey came-they were there that day, yes. 
"Q. State whether or not on the 1st of November 
you considered your stock was surrendered 
to the company. 
''A. ~\t that tin1e my stock was. I considered 
myself as owning the minority." 
R. 219, questioned by Mr. Mulliner. 
"Q. State whether or not you considered you had 
the right to withdraw that certificate at any 
time after that. 
"A. No, I didn't have." 
Mr. Sorensen testified (R. 229, 230) that he couldn't 
remember and couldn't say whether Horne's and Soren-
sen's certificates were at the company prior to when 
Dr. Horne signed the Kartchner certificates or not, but 
that he was positive both the Horne and Sorensen certi-
ficates were in the office on November 1st, the date when 
plaintiffs' certificate was issued, and remained there con-
tinually thereafter. 
Appellants, in their statement of facts, assume and 
state as facts things that are absolutely not supported 
by this record. The most serious of these statements ap-
pears the first time at Page 4, where they state the fact 
to be: 
"Neither the letters nor the enclosed certifi-
cates had been received at the corporation offices 
at the time the Kartchner certificate was signed 
on November 1, 1949." 
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And again at Page 5: 
.. It had not been received bv Sorensen or tlw 
corporation at the tin1e the Ka.~·tchner certificate 
was issued." 
The record, at Page 196, is quoted in support of this 
statement. This statement is merely a statement of Dr. 
Horne's wherein Sorensen told him at the tin1e of the 
signing of appellants' certificate that he had not received 
his resignation. On this same page of the record, Dr. 
Home testifies unequivocally that. the Horne stock and 
Sorensen stock were surrendered. The positive testi-
mony of Sorensen himself here again is that his stock, 
as well as Dr. Horne's stock, was a part of the books and 
records of this corporation on November 1st, and were 
available for inspection by Mr. Kartchner, who then 
became Secretary of the corporation and the official 
custodian of its books and records (R. 218, 219). 
Another flagrant example of this practice is con-
tained· on Page 6 of their brief where this argument is 
made: 
"He (Sorensen) had made no transfer of his 
own stock but contemplated doing so in the fu-
ture (197). Up until the meeting was held with 
Homer Winder on or after November 17, 1949, 
Sorensen didn't know how much of his stock he 
might be required to surrender to effectuate his 
plans (208, 209, 220)." 
In support of this statement, Appellants quote from 
Dr. Horne's deposition: 
"A. 200,000 in the company, and I had turned 
mine in, Myrtle had turned her's in, and the 
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only one I knew about was the certificate I 
signed, 100,000, and Frederick owned 101,000. 
It was up to Mr. Kartchner after that, wasn't 
itY 
"Q. Did you check prior to the time you issued 
this certificate, to see if any other stock than 
your stock and :Mrs. Horne's stock had ac-
tually been surrendered to the company~ 
"A. I asked Frederick if he was going to transfer 
his stock to Mr. Kartchner, and he said that 
was the arrangement." 
This quotation is only to the effect, as consistently 
maintained throughout this case, that Sorensen had and 
did surrender his stock. The latter sentence of the above 
argument is absolutely contrary to the testimony in the 
record. The fact, in this connection, was that Sorensen 
surrendered all his stock on November 1st, which was 
absolutely necessary, in any event, and the matter of how 
much he was to receive back from the corporation de-
pended on whatever other stock was surrendered. This 
is conclusively shown by plaintiffs' expressed under-
standing in the meeting of June 6th with Judge Jeppson. 
The gentlemen involved in this transaction were not 
technicians in the handling of corporate affairs and they 
intended obviously that the stock surrenders and trans-
fers should be more or less simultaneous. The fact re-
mains and is conceded by all that Kartchner received 
one-half the stock of this corporation and nobody has 
ever denied or impeached his right to the same, and if 
any irregularities existed in the matter of the books of 
the company it was Mr. Kartchner's responsibility, as 
10 
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the secretary of the emnpauy, to see that such irregulari-
ties were rectified. 
The facts of this case show a clear and compl~tP 
estoppel on the part of each party to upset this trant-'-
action. This is readily apparent if, instead of the corpo-
ration failing, it had prospered and the action was 
brought by Sorensen and Horne to declare ICartchners' 
stock void. In such a state of circu1nstances there can 
be little doubt but what they would be estopped to assert 
such a thing and it is equally apparent that ICartchners 
should now be placed in the same position. It is sub-
mitted that a finding of fact or rule of law should be ap-
plied which works both ways in case the shoe was on the 
other foot, as illustrated above. 
Only $1,750.00 of the purchase price for plaintiffs' 
stock has been paid up to November 1st. It is impossible 
to believe, and the trial Court did not believe, that a 
businessman of ~Ir. Kartchner's talents would pay the 
balance of $11,296.53 without having assured himself 
that Sorensen's certificate for 101,000 shares was sur-
rendered to the corporation, especially when he was fully 
aware of the situation (R. 215,216, 217). 
POINT I 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDINGS OBJECTED TO BY APPELLANTS. 
In this division of appellants' brief they take ob-
jection to the trial Court's findings, Nos. 12, 13, 15' 16, 
17, 19 and 20, on the ground that there is not evidence 
to support them. The argument will be taken up as 
11 
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to each of these findings in that order. 
Findings Nos. 12 a.nd 13 
This finding is supported squarely by the record 
at Page 219, where Sorensen testified as follows: 
"Q. During these negotiations, during the sum-
mer, was Dr. Horne involved in any manned 
"A. No. 
"Q. Were the dealings exclusively between you 
and Kartchner¥ 
"A. Yes, we were the only ones that ever dis-
cussed the matter I know of." 
This state of affairs is conclusively affirmed by the 
fact that Dr. Horne did not know with whom Sorensen 
was dealing until November 1st, when his name was first 
mentioned. Dr. Horne testified (R.190): 
"Q. Did you ever talk with Mr. Kartchner in your 
life about this deal prior to November 1st? 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. After November 1st did you have anyth.i.n.g 
to do with this company whatsoever Y 
"A. Well, I sent my wife down one time to ask 
them to pay the rent. 
"Q. Other than being their landlord, I mean in 
the internal affairs of the corporation, did 
you take any part? 
"A. No sir." 
Appellants then in their brief re-argue the same 
proposition of fact that they make in their findings of 
fact, which is, that Sorensen's stock was not delivered to 
12 
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the corporation or endorsed prior to the issuance to 
Kartchners of their certificate, and practically the whole 
testimony is repeated again. Assun1ing that the argu-
ment presented by appellants has any merit, they have 
the burden of proving that I~artchners' certificate wa~ 
issued prior to the surrender of Sorensen's certificate. 
There is not one u·ord of e~·idence in this record which 
supports th.is. 
In speaking of any representation, the evidence of 
Dr. Horne is (R. 114) : 
"Q. When you signed that certificate you ill-
tended the Kartchners to rely on its valid-
ity and genuineness, did you not Dr. Horne"{ 
''A. When I sign an instrument yes, it is supposed 
to be genuine and it was genuine." 
The argument commencing at Page 15 of appellants' 
brief is to the effect that the signature of Dr. Horne on 
the stock certificate amounts to a false representation. 
Dr. Horne, as above indicated, testifies squarely that 
appellants' stock certificate was genuine. 
Sorensen testifies time and again that Kartchner's 
certificate was genuine. Add to this the fact that both 
appellants and Sorensen, immediately upon the issuance 
of their certificate, sat down and held a stockholders' 
meeting and that Mr. Kartchner was elected Secretary 
and thereby became the custodian and in possession .of 
the stock books and records, and thereafter continued to 
pay substantially all the purchase price for this stock. 
Mr. Sorensen, at the time of this Ineeting, testified that 
18 
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Dr. Horne was no longer a stockholder (R. 232) and that 
Sorensen's stock was surrendered in the same manner. 
Again at Page 18 of appellants' brief the same testi-
rnony is set out as is set out in the statement of Fact and 
appellants continue to urge that the dialogue there refers 
to November 1st, when, as has been previously indicated, 
Sorensen, on being asked, testified that that part of the 
deposition, so far as dates were concerned, referred to 
October 31st and not November 1st. 
"Q. I show you your deposition and I'll ask you 
to read the same places where you went, and 
asking if when you answered that it hadn't 
been turned back to which date you refer? 
"A. I don't understand your question, Dick. 
"Q. Now on this down here where you read, 
what date are you referring to1 
"A. To October 31st. 
"Q. And it was returned November 1sU 
"A. Yes. 
. . '"'" 
Questioned by Mr. Mulliner: 
"Q. It was returned November 1st~ 
"A. It was returned November 1st." 
At the top of Page 20 of appellants' brief, this 
answer of Dr. Horne's was given: 
"A. While he still owned it, and after we had 
given ours to him, I think they were lying 
in the drawer together, but he hadn't signed 
his at tha.t time because he didn't know who 
wa-s gotng to get it." (Italics ~ appellants.) 
14 
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Appellants insist that this testimony shows that 
Sorensen's certificate was not endorsed. This specific 
answer was asked Dr. Horne and he said the drawer he 
referred to was in his office not the corporations, and the 
date must, therefore, be October 31st. (See Record 204) : 
".\. That is where the phrase referring to those 
that were lying in the dnrwer together before 
I mailed then1. 
''Q. That is what you meant by that, is that 
correct'? 
''A. That is right.'' 
. At Page 20, appellants again assume that the Horne 
and Sorensen stock was not received until after Kartch-
ners' certificate was issued and assmne further that on 
N" ovember 1st, Sorensen's certificate was not endorsed. 
The only testimony given on this subject was by S-oren-
sen and this testimony is as follows (R. 229): 
"Q. Mr. Sorensen, in answer to ~:ir. Mulliner's 
question whether Dr. Horne's stock and yours 
was in the office on the day the stock certifi-
cate was issued * * * I believe you said they 
were. 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. They were in the office prior to the time you 
issued that certificate, were they~ 
"A. That I can't say definitely, Mr. Tanner, be-
cause I don't know. The doctor mailed those 
certificates- what time of day the Kartch-
ners were there I can't remember. I gave no 
thought to the matter_ at that time. 
15 
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"Q. You gave no thought whether the other cer-
tificates were in at that time~ 
"A. No, I knew they would be there ; I knew those 
certificates were forthcoming, let's put it that 
way. 
'"' . . 
"Q. 'rhen when you prepared the 100,000 share 
certificate, did you or didn't you know that 
the other certificates were there or on the 
way to you? 
"A. I didn't know at that particular time whether 
they were on their way at that time or there, 
I don't know the precise time or anything." 
It is submitted that this type of testimony abso-
lutely refutes the position taken by appellants and can 
in no way be considered as testimony that will support 
the burden of proof placed upon appellants. 
The fact still remains that Sorensen's certificate for 
101,000 shares was a part of the books and records of this 
corporation on November 1st, and there it remained till 
June of 1950, and when removed it bore the endorsement 
of Sorensen (See R. 226) : 
Questioned by ~fr. l\tlulliner: 
"Q. Where were these stock books and records 
kept, if you lmow l 
"A. 'fhey were kept in the company. 
"Q. vVhat do you mean, in the company1 
"A. In the desk in the office of the Clicquot Club 
Bottling Company. 
"Q. Do you know of your own knowledge they 
were there all the time f 
16 
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"A. All the thne until I believe June of 1950." 
On cross examination, ~Ir. Sorensen testified further 
(R. 182): 
"Q. :Mr. Sorensen, do you know where your stock 
certificate was .X oveinber 1st •? 
··A. November 1st, at the plant, 
"Q. \Vhat do you mean by the plant1 
.. A. You 1nean- in the- pardon me - Clicquot 
Club Bottling Cmnpany, in the office in 
the drawer where we kept all the stock. 
"Q. Was it there November 1st 1 
•'A. Yes, I think it was. 
"Q. How long was it there, do you know1 
"A. It was there until June, 1950. 
"Q. And were all the stock records kept in the 
Clicquot Club office in the drawer there 1 
"A. Yes." 
There is no evidence of when the endorsement of 
Sorensen was made on his certificate for 101,000 shares. 
The above evidence shows that the certificate was placed 
with the other cancelled stock certificates of the bottling 
company and remained there continuously until June of 
1950, at which time and upon its removal it bore this 
endorsement. There is positive testimony, as indicated 
above, that the stock was surrendered which connotes 
and indicates beyond question that it was endorsed. The 
testimony of Sorensen, as a whole, shows that he was 
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Appellants point to an instance in Dr. Horne's testi-
mony and an instance in Sorensen's testimony from which 
they infer that it was not endorsed on November 1st. 
However, in each of those instances the witness involved 
testified positively, as indicated above, that they were 
not referring to November 1st but to October 31st, when 
they testified the stock was not endorsed. 
The whole argument and brief of appellants is 
predicated, therefore, on a fact that does not exist and 
the finding of the trial Court that there was stock for re-
issue on November 1st is arnply supported and is decisive 
of this law suit. 
Finding No. 15 
The objection to this finding seems to be nothing 
short of frivolous. (See R. 223) : 
"Q. Who handled those books~ 
"A. lvir. Kartchner did. 
"Q. "\Vho had custody of them~ 
"A. Mr. Kartchner kept them. 
"Q. Where were they kept~ 
"A. In the office of the company." 
(R. 183): 
"Q. It was returned November 1stf 
"A. It was returned November 1st. 
"Q. But the stock books and the stock was there 
all the time~ 
"A. They were there all the time. 
18 
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"Q. Did Mr. Kartchner have access to this 
drawer! 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did this drawer contain other records of the 
company! 
'"A. Yes, it held all the books of the company, 
what books there might be." 
Finding No. 16 
At the risk of see1ning repetitious, to answer the 
objections to this finding it must be repeated that both 
the Kartchners knew that Sorensen. had 101,000 shares 
of stock so that in all events that certificate must be 
surrendered -if Kartchners were to get 100,000 shares. 
The· support for Finding No. 16 is found at Page 217 
of this record. Sorensen's testimony: 
"A. Before November 1st I had agreed if any-
thing happened where I couldn't own half 
of the stock myself I would take a lower 
issue." 
Question (by Mr. Mulliner): 
"Q. Did you tell Kartchner that¥ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you tell him that on more than one occa-
sion! · 
"A. Specifically I can't say how many times. We 
talked the same thing over so many times 
it was repetitious. 
"Q. This subject and this arrangement was dis-
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The question of Mrs. Kartchner's status in this law-
suit may just as well be disposed of here. She became 
an officer of the corporation on November 1st and sub-
stantially all the purchase price for this stock was paid 
from joint funds, of which she must have had knowledge 
subsequent to this date. 
She was called as a witness and did not deny that 
Mr. Kartchner was acting in her behalf in any particular. 
In view of this fact, how can appellant by assumption and 
innuendo ask the trial Court or this Court to grant her 
more relief than Mr. Kartchner, or place her in a better 
position in any respect than ~Ir. Kartchner1 
'Vhile a witness, if such was the fact, she was in a 
position to repudiate any or all things that her husband 
did, but she did not make this choice and, therefore, both 
Mr. and Mrs. Kartchner should be treated exactly alike. 
This action of Mrs. Kartchner, as a witness, conclu-
sively shows and establishes an appointment of Mr. 
Kartchner as her agent, which has never been repudiated 
or questioned. 
Finding No. 17 
Reading of this record will show beyond any ques-
tion that Finding No. 17 is supported and that there was 
stock in the treasury of the company on November 1st 
available for re-issue on that day. 
Appellants, for the third time, recite the same evi-
dence and make the same contentions as they did in the 
Statement of Facts and their arguments attacking Find-
ings No. 12 and 13. They argue at Pages 22 and 23 again 
that the Sorensen stock was not returned on November 
20 
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1st. The only evidence on this subject is given by Soren-
sen who states positively it was (R. 229). Sorensen in his 
testimony couldn't say definitely whether the shares were 
there at the ti1ue the certificates were signed by Dr. 
Horne or whether they weren't (R. p. 230). 
Appellants have the burden of proof on this issue 
and again they try to sustain it by legalistic and techni-
cal construction of the testin10ny and by pure inference 
in the facts of positive testimony to the contrary, and 
positive testimony of a witness who was the only one in a 
position to know that he has no recollection of this fact to 
which they attach so much importance. As against this 
practice there is the testimony of Sorensen, as herein-
above indicated, that his stock was surrendered on No-
vember 1st and that he had no further right to it, nor 
any right to remove it from the records of the corpora-
tion and it was not removed but appears as Exhibit 2 in 
its order of cancelled certificates. 
On Page 24 of appellants' brief they continue to 
argue that Sorensen did not know how much he would 
have to transfer to the corporation. This is absolutely 
opposed to the positive evidence of Sorensen and could 
not possibly be the fact because Sorensen had to sur-
render his certificate for 101,000 shares no matter how 
much other stock was surrendered. Upon such surrender 
then the question as to how much should be re-issued be-
came important and this was determined to be 42,000 
shares, as agreed to and affirmed by Mr. Kartchner. 
The position of plaintiffs could be maintained if on 
~ November 1st Sorensen had surrendered his 101,000 and 
:!1 
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issued certificates in the sum of 100,000 each to himself 
and to Kartchner, but this was not done and according 
to positive testimony was never intended. However, ap-
pellants treat this transaction as if 100,000 shares were 
issued to Sorensen thereby making Kartchners' certifi-
cate excessive in the amount of stock represented by 
Stanis and Winder. Such an arrangement does not con-
stitute the facts in this case. 
Finding No. 19 
This finding is supported by the evidence and, as 
indicated herein before, ~Irs. Kartchner was called as a 
witness ·where she admitted (R. 182) that Mr. Kartchner 
did most. of her. business and that they talked this trans-
action over. 
She was called as a witness and did not repudiate or 
deny any agency in her husband and this question can-
not be raised on the appeal for whatever legal effect it 
may have. 
-To this may be added that the fact of lack of agency 
was never put in issue by Mrs. Kartchner and during 
the course of the trial such fact was never raised and was 
taken by· the Court and by the parties to be admitted. 
Finding No. 20 
In support of appellants' position as to this finding, 
the same argument is again made. The Court found, 
and ·with ample testimony to support it, that there were 
no false representations made as to the accounts payable 
or at an. 
Stated in another way, the stock book of this corpo-
ration, as evidenced by Exhibit 3 - an analysis made by 
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Judge Jeppson- sliows that instead of tUl over-issue 
there is 42,000 shares of stock remaining unissued which 
Sorensen claimed. The only question raised by appel-
lants in this connection is whether Dr. Horne should 
have signed the certificate or whether Sorensen should 
have signed the certificate. In either case, the problern 
is one of such technical proportions that it should be 
given no legal significance in view of the fact that every-
body connected with the corporation considered the stock 
valid and the owner of it w~s afforded all the control in 
the internal 1nanagement of the company that the stock 
represented. 
Every presumption should be made where doubt ex-
ists in favor of the legality of such a set of circumstances. 
This rule is most aptly applied when if such presumption 
is exercised the result conforms to the exact intention 
of the parties, as is the case here. So, assuming that 
Sorensen's stock had not arrived at the office of the 
bottling company at the time Dr. Horne signed Kart-
chners' certificate, the presumption should be applied 
in view of Sorensen's testimony that the stock was there 
at the time the certificate was delivered to Kartchners 
and the stockholders' meeting held on November 1, 1949. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE FINDINGS ON ALL MA-
TERIAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE CASE. 
In this section of appellants' brief the objection is 
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As has been indicated heretofore, the Court made 
finding on all these issues scheduled in appellants' brief 
from A to E, inclusive. The finding of the Court was 
that there was stock available for issue which was amply 
supported, as has been indicated, and the Court thereby 
made adverse findings to those proposed in this section 
of the argument of appellants. The argument here is 
the same as under Point I of appellants' brief. 
POINT III 
THE ISSUANCE OF THE KARTCHNER STOCK IF IR-
REGULAR WAS VALID. 
The remainder of appellants' brief is concerned with 
the power of Dr. Horne to sign a valid certificate, and 
they continue to assume that Sorensen's stock was not 
surrendered. 
Assuming this to be true, the law as hereinafter 
cited indicates conclusively that under such assumption, 
stock issued as was done in this case still becomes effec-
tive and is considered to be lawful. The technicalities 
involved which are argued by appellants are mere ir-
regularities which are corrected by c~mduct and by the 
ability of the corporation to make such corrections. 
Dr. Horne, until 'Sorensen was elected and qualified 
as president, was the de factrr president of the corpora-
tion. See U.C.A. 1953_, 16-2-25: 
"ld. Hold Office Until Successors Qualify. 
Officers after having duly qualified may 
continue to exercise the duties of their offices un-
. til their successors shall be duly elected or ap-
pointed and qualified, unless sooner removed in 
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the tnanner prescribed by the articles of incorpo-
ration or by-laws, or, in case no provision is made 
therein for such removal, according to the provi-
sions of this chapter." 
See also 13 Atn. Juris. 859 : 
"Further than this, it is a general rule that 
the directors or trustees of a corporation hold 
over until their successors are elected. Statutes 
frequently provide that the directors of a corpo-
ration shall hold office for a specified period 
(usually one year) and until their successors are 
chosen and qualified. The Uniform Act provides 
that a director shall hold office for the term for 
which he was na1ned or elected and until his suc-
cessor is elected and qualified, and that except as 
otherwise prescribed in the articles or by-laws, 
a director shall be elected for a term of one year. 
It has also been ruled that the president of a 
corporation properly elected holds over until an-
other president is elected, although there is no 
special provision in the charter to that effect." 
In the situation that exists here, there can be no 
question but that Dr. Horne was acting as a de facto 
officer even under the assumption made by the appel-
lants. He comes clearly within the definition of such an 
officer as set out in 13 Am. Juris. 861 where it is said: 
"876. Generally: Who Are de Facto Offi-
cers.- A de facto officer of a private corpora-
tion may be defined as one in possession of and 
exercising the powers of the office under the 
claim and color of an election or appointment, 
although he is not an officer de jure and may be 
removed by proper proceedings. Considering the 
effects of his acts, an officer de facto is one whose 
25 
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acts, although not those of a lawful officer, the 
law, upon principles of policy and justice, will 
hold valid, so far as they involve the interests of 
the public and third persons. To constitute one 
a de facto officer, he must hold office under some 
degree of notoriety or color of title, and the mere 
assumption of title to office on one occasion can-
not clothes persons with the title of de facto offi-
cers. Persons informally or irregularly elected to 
office who exercise the functions of the officer are 
de facto officers. Thus, where the stockholders or 
members of a corporation proceed by an informal 
or irregular exercise to an existing power of elec-
tion to elect certain officers, the persons so elect-
ed are, until removal, regarded as officers de 
·facto.". 
The validity of the acts of such officer is established 
under the rules set out in 13 Amer. Juris. 862 : 
"877. Validity of Acts of de Facto Officers. 
-The de facto doctrine is one of those legal make-
shifts by which unlawful or irregular corporate 
and public acts are legalized for certain purposes 
on the score of necessity. It was introduced into 
the laws as a matter of policy and necessity to 
protect the interests of the public and individuals 
where those interests were involved in the official 
acts of persons exercising the duties of an office 
without being lawful officers. It is accordingly 
well settled that the acts of de· facto officers of 
a private corporatio_n are binding as to a third 
person who deals with them in ignorance of their 
want of legal right to the office. It is likewise the 
rule that the acts of directors de facto of a corpo-
ration are valid as to third persons." 
26 
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Smne point is n1ade in appellants' brief that Dr. 
Horne was ineligible to act as an officer of the corpora-
tion because he was not a stockholder thereof. The rule 
appears to be that in spite of such ineligibility persons 
so acting bind the corporation and clothe such acts with 
legality both as to the officers and the corporation. See 
Amer. Juris. 861 : 
"One may be a de facto officer although he 
is ineligible to hold the office. To a similar effect, 
persons held out by the corporation as its offi-
cers may becmne de facto officers. For example, 
directors continuing to manage the affairs of the 
corporation after the expiration of the term of 
their office may becmne de facto directors." 
See also Watson v. Johnson, 17 4 Wash. 12, 24 Pac. 
(2) 592, 89 A.L.R.. 1527. In this case, directors of a build-
ing and loan association were ineligible to hold office 
under the statute because of their lack of stock holding. 
The Supreme Court of Washington held that their acts 
in behalf of the corporation bound the corporation and 
that they acted as de facto officers. 
The contention of appellants if it be assumed that 
Sorensen's stock was returned unindorsed, cannot be 
maintained inasmuch as there was a transfer and deo 
livery to the corporation with an intention to pass title of 
the Sorensen stock to the corporation on November 1st. 
Such a set of cirsumstances entitled the transferee to 
specific performance and the trial court in this case was 
authorized to hind Sorensen by such transfer and to 
consider in this equitable action the maxim that equity 
~ ) ..... 
... , 
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requires to be done what ought to be done. See 13 Am. 
Jur. 415. -
"According to the prevailing rule, however, a 
verbal sale or pledge of stock transfers at least 
the equitable title and is valid and binding be-
tween the parties. While the printed form of 
transfer with power of attorney, commonly placed 
on the back of a stock certificate, furnishes a con-
venient and appropriate means of transfer in the 
ordinary course of business, such transfer may 
also be made by delivery of unindorsed certifi-
cates together with specific assignments. Under 
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the delivery of a 
certificate by the person appearing to be the 
owner thereof without the necessary indorsement, 
but with intent to transfer such certificate or 
shares, imposes upon the person so delivering 
an obligation, which may be specifically enforced, 
to complete the transaction by making the neces-
sary indorsement." 
The case of in re Hom bach and Company, 9 Fed. (2) 
359, (Third Circuit) is a case exactly in poh1t and in-
volves ·the action of a corporation and its officers in issu-
ing stock over and above the authorized limits pre-
scribed by the articles of incorporation. In that case 
Rombach and Company were bankr_upt. The claims of 
plaintiffs who had purchased this over~issued. stock.were 
disallowed in the bankruptcy proceedings. Plaintiff pur-
chased the stock and claimed it void because the stock 
was in excess of the authorized amount and that they 
thereby became creditors of the corporation. The bank-
ruptcy court held the .stock valid, _which holding was af-
firmed on this appeal. The authorized capital stock of 
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the corporation was $200,000. The directors authorized 
an increase to $250,000 and issued $261,000. None of the 
statutory procedures for such increase were complied 
with. A year later, one of many of the statutory proced-
ures was made which consisted of a state~nent to the 
Secretary of the Conunonwealth which showed an in-
crease to $350,000. This Federal Court holds squarely 
in conformity "ith the line of cases cited therein, that 
in the event of the irregularity in the issuance of shares, 
the shares so issued are valid if by any legal procedure 
the corporation can correct such irregularity even 
though they are required to increase their capital stock. 
The court said: 
"On the other hand, stock which the corpo-
ration has power to issue, but issues irregularly, 
is valid as to the holder, and in a suit for the pay-
ment of such stock he may not defend on the 
ground that it was irrregularly issued. The state 
alone may raise the question of irregularity. 
"It has also long since been settled in the 
federal and in many state courts that one who 
contracts with an acting corporation cannot de-
fend himself against a claim on his contract in 
a suit_ by the corporation by alleging the irregu-
larity of its organization. The same rule applies 
to the increase of the stock of a corporation in 
a suit for the payment of stock constituting the 
increase. The trustee of a bankrupt corporation 
represents both the corporation and its creditors, 
and in a suit by him for the payment of the stock 
forming the increase, which the corporation had 
power to issue, but issued irregularly, the defense 
of the irregularity of the issue cannot prevail. 
29 
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Dutchess Cotton Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 14 
Johns. (N.Y.) 238, 7 Am. Dec. 459; Buffalo & 
Allegheny Railroad Co. v. Cary, 26 N.Y. 75; 
Chubb v. Upton, 95 U.S. 665, 24 L. Ed. 523; Pull. 
man v. Upton, 96 U.S. 328, 24 L. Ed. 818; Handley 
v. Stutz, 139 U.S. 417, 424, 11 S. Ct. 530, 35 L. Ed. 
227." 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED 'FROM OBTAINING 
ANY RELIEF. 
The testimony of Fred Sorensen in this case as cor-
roborated by Dr. Horne, was entitled to the full confi-
dence of the trial court. This testimony is to the effect 
that Mr. Kartchner knew of the stock holding prior to 
November 1st and fully appreciated the fact that Soren-
sen's certificate would be and was surrendered. The 
matter of the failure of the other stock being surrendered 
and the position of Sorensen in having his stock holding 
reduced was discussed on numerous occasions before No-
vember 1st. Within a month after November 1st, the 
matter was discussed in a meeting with Homer Winder 
wherein it was understood that Sorensen was a minority 
stockholder. Still later, and in June of 1950, Kartchner 
acknowledged that he was aware of the fact that Soren-
sen was entitled. to only 42,000 shares of stock and had 
known this since November 1, 1949. At this time he was 
negotiating a sale of his stock to Mrs. Winder, and there 
was no dispute as to the relative holdings of all the per-
sons involved. 
In addition to this, and has been previously indi-
cated, Kartchner ·was the secretary of the corporation 
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and in possession of the stock books and records, and 
these records contained the Sorensen certificate through-
out the whole time involved. 
Appellants were in the best position of anyone con-
nected with this corporation to know what the stock 
holdings were, and yet no objection was made to any 
irregularity. Their failure to object to anything sur-
rounding their purchase of stock is easily understandable 
because there was nothing wrong with it. Assuming as 
they do that there 'vas, appellants were in the best posi-
tion of anyone to make such discovery. Finally, they 
paid practically all the purchase price for their stock 
after November 1, 1949. 
Law or equity places the burden upon contracting 
parties to either assume the obligations incident thereto 
or to rescind the same if they are so entitled. Such par-
ties cannot withhold action until they determine whether 
the result of such a contract is to their advantage or dis-
advantage, and then make an election. This principle is 
especially true where the corporate stock is involved. See 
13 Am. J ur. 260: 
"It is well settled that rescission by a stock-
holder who claims to have been defrauded in his 
purchase of the stock cannot rescind after th~ 
corporation is insolvent and in the hands of a re-
ceiver." 
Burningham v. Burke, 245 Pac. 977, is a Utah case 
which is now established as the leading authority for 
the doctrine that persons claiming to be defrauded are 
subject to the doctrine of laches and cannot rescind a 
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stock subscription contract as against creditors who be-
came such after the date of the subscription. 
The case of Skola v. Merrill, 65 Pac. (2) 185, (Utah 
1937) is controlling in this case and the holding there 
precludes these appellants from any relief. 
In this action plaintiff sued the Deseret Mortuary 
Company, Charles S. Merrill, an officer, and others, as a 
result of a stock purchase by plaintiff. The action was 
one for rescission based upon the false representation 
made by Charles S. Merrill and others. The trial court 
found for plaintiff and the Supreme Court dismissed the 
case as to the Deseret Mortuary and sent the case back 
for a new trial as to the other defendants after receiving 
the evidence. 
After plaintiff purchased the stock, he attended two 
stockholders meetings and a directors meeting. The 
representation claimed to be false was that the LDS 
Church was a stockholder and would not allow the com-
pany to fail financially. This Court held squarely that 
rescission would n~t be granted under these circum-
stances inasmuch as 'Skola had full opportunity to ex-
amine the books and determine for himself in less than 
three years what the exact status of the stockholding 
was. The Court said: 
"At the stockholders' meetings full informa-
tion was obtainable as to who the stockholders 
were, the amount of stock issued, and what, if any, 
church ,position they or any of them held. There 
is not anything in the record to indicate that he 
could not have had access to the books and records 
of the company at any time for the purpose of 
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learning these facts. ., • • It would seern 1nore 
than a 1nere coincidence that the time fixed by 
hin1 when he learned of the fraud, that is, in 
JulY of 1932, is almost of the exact time when the 
fimi.ncial depression reached its lowest point and 
was only two months before the Deseret l\{ortuary 
and the :Jierrill :Jiortuaries, Inc., went into re-
ceivership." 
The concurring opinion of Justice Elias Hansen 
points up the striking snnilarity between the facts in 
this case and the facts in the Skola case as witnessed by 
the following excerpt from this opinion. 
"During the period that lapsed between the 
time of the purchase and the bringing of this suit, 
plaintiff could have readily ascertained the truth 
or falsity of the representations which he claims 
induced him to purchase the stock. He attended 
stockholders' and directors' meetings. The only 
reasonable inference to be drawn from the evi-
dence in the record before us is that plaintiff was 
content with his deal until he was disappointed 
in his hope and expectation of realizing large 
profits from his investment. Even if there were 
some over-reaching of the Merrills in selling the 
stock, still the remedy of rescission is not open to 
plaintiff because he failed to act within a reason-
able time after he discovered or had a reasonable 
opportunity to discover the fraud. Rescission is 
denied whenever the one seeking it fails to act 
promptly after the discovery of the fraud, or, 
what amounts to the same thing, after he had had 
a reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud. 
6 R.C.L. 935, 317. That plaintiff had ample op-
portunity to discover the fraud practiced upon 
him, if any, soon after the occurrence of the trans-
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action complained of is clear. He should not be 
permitted to hold the stock to see if it would turn 
out to be a profitable investment despite the 
claimed fraud and then when it did not prove 
profitable recover back all that he paid." 
It is conceded that there was no deliberate act by 
Dr. Horne or Sorensen which would constitute fraud. 
It is contended by appellants that an act committed in 
good faith by these persons resulted in a situation made 
fraudulent by rules of law. Neither Dr. Horne or Soren-
sen were in a position to discover this purported tech-
nical irregularity in the issuance of this stock. Mr. 
l{artchner was in the best position to do so. As Secre-
tary of this corporation, it was his duty to keep and 
maintain the corporate records and to see that they 
were in order. Full information was at his finger tips 
as to who the stockholders were. The records of stock-
holdings of this corporation were easily and readily 
ascertainable by him in order to establish the truth or 
falsity of any representation made by the appearance 
of any stock certificate. This is the test laid down in 
the Skola case, Supra, and precludes a recovery in this 
action. 
Appellants, during the argument in the trial court 
and in their brief, have presented no cases with facts 
similar to those present here. And no case has been 
. . discovered where liability of officers of a corporation IS 
upheld where there has not been a deliberate or conscious 
intent to defraud a prospective purchaser of such stock. 
No case has been discovered where such liability is im· 
posed rinless there was some awareness on the part of 
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the officers held liable of the Inisrepresentation being 
made. 
The cases and notes cited by appellants have conl-
mon in them the fact of misrepresentation. The stock 
certificate of appellants does not contain a misrepre-
sentation anywhere on its face and no misrepresentation 
was ever made, either in law or in fact. The sig-nature 
of Dr. Horne over the title President was made either 
as a de jure or de facto officer as indicated hereinabove. 
The annotations at 73 A.L.R. 1120 and 99 A.L.R. 
852 and the cases cited therefrom all deal with actual 
misrepresentations and are not similar in facts or prin-
ciple to the problem involved here. These cases and notes 
all deal, where liability of a director is concerned, with 
charging such director with negligence or a consciousness 
that a false representation is being made. The case of 
Pruitt v. Oklahoma Steam Baking Company, 135 Pac. 
730 is not in point, and the case of Garnett v. State ex rel 
Bank Commissioner, 19 Pac. (2) 375 is not in point 
under these facts. In the Garnett case an increase stock 
not authorized by statute was sustained, and it was held 
there that such an increase could be ratified by estoppel. 
The court in the Garnett case sets out the rule to be as 
follows: 
"14 C.J. 496, announces the following rule: 
'The capital stock of a corporation cannot 
legally be increased except to the extent; under 
the conditions and in the manner prescribed by 
the charter or statute, as the case may be, al-
though mere irregularities in proceedings may be 
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cured by cond~tct amounting to acquiescence, rati-
fication, or estoppel, and an increase will not 
necessarily be invalidated as between the cor-
poration and the assenting stockholders by a fail-
ure to comply with requirements intended for 
the benefit of the public. The provisions of the 
charter or other governing statute touching an 
increase of the capital stock of a corporation 
must govern subsisting contractual requirement~ 
in the making of such increase.' 
* * * • 
'The true rule is, when action is brought in 
behalf of creditors by the representative of an 
insolvent financial corporation, like a bank or 
trust company organized and conducted for the 
purpose of soliciting and receiving deposits from 
the public, to enforce the statutory liability of its 
stockholders, that those, who have subscribed for 
an increase of stock within the power of the cor-
poration to make, who have received and accept-
ed certificates of stock issued to them, and whose 
names thus have been entered on the books of the 
corporation as stockholders, who have collected 
and kept dividends on such stock, and who have 
acted as stockholders directly or indirectly in the 
management of the corporation, will not be heard 
to defeat such am action on the ground that the 
stock was increased in an irregular or unlawful 
manner.'" 
In the East River Bottom Water Company cases, 
128 Pac. (2) 277 and 167 Pac. (2) 693, the factual situa-
tion was that stock was re-issued by the corporation 
upon representation to it that the original certificates 
were lost. These cases are patently not in point upon 
their facts or legal principles with this case. 
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The Oregon cases including Wills vs. Nehale·m Coal 
Company, 96 Pac. (2) 528, are not in point, inasmuch 
as there was a conscious act and intentional omission 
by the directors of the corporation involved, which 
amounted to a misrepresentation. 
This case is easily distinguishable from those cited 
by appellants, because in this case there is no repre-
sentation in the first place. In the second place, the 
court found that stock was present and available for 
re-issue and was re-issued. These findings, as has been 
indicated, are overwhelmingly supported by the evi-
dence. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Appellants in this action have invoked the aid of a 
court of equity in the hope of rescinding a stock purchase 
agreement. It is conceded on all sides that there was no 
over-reaching or intent to cheat or defraud them by re-
spondents. The stock so purchased has, since the time 
of purchase, been treated as valid and subsisting by all 
persons connected with the corporation. There was 
positive and conclusive evidence that there was nothing 
irregular about the issuance of the stock and that it 
was exactly as represented. 
Appellants, by inference and innuendo are trying to 
warp isolated parts of this evidence into a pattern of 
fact which would indicate that Sorensen's stock was not 
surrendered or endorsed prior to the minute and hout 
on November 1 when Kartchner's certificate was issued. 
The positive evidence is that Sorensen's stock was sur-
rendered on November 1. 
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The correctness of the decision reached by the trial 
court is conclusively demonstrated by placing the shoe 
on the other foot. For example, there can be no doubt 
as to the outcome of a law suit under these facts if 
Sorensen had been the plaintiff suing to have Kartch-
ner's stock declared invalid. The simple answer to such 
a law suit would be that equity would require Sorensen 
to surrender his stock if he had not already done so 
and thereby insure the validity of Kartchner's stock. 
Appellants therefore have been completely protected 
in this transaction from the beginning and these re-
spondents should be similarly treated. 
Finally, under the rule in the Skala case, Supra, 
appellants are precluded from any recovery herein. The 
The language of Justice Hansen in that case to the 
effect that the only reasonable inference to be drawn 
from the evidence was that plaintiff was content with 
his deal until disappointed in his hope for profit and 
that a plaintiff should not be permitted to hold stock 
to see if it would turn out to be profitable despite a 
claim of fraud and when it did not prove profitable 
recover what he had paid. This statement of Justice 
Hansen explains and describes the conduct of these 
appellants in this case. The sale of this stock was in 
all respects made in good faith, and such sale was recog-
nized not only by the parties participating therein, but 
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by all other stockholders of the corporation. It is sub-
mitted that appellants suffered no civil wrong at the 
hands of these respondents and that the decision of the 
trial court which reached this conclusion should be 
sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER, 
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